The impact of career politicians: evidence from US governor by Pickard, H.
This is a repository copy of The impact of career politicians: evidence from US governor.




Pickard, H. (2021) The impact of career politicians: evidence from US governor. Kyklos, 74





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 




The professionalization of politics refers to a set of particular values and
standards that politicians hold themselves to in order to increase likelihood of
success in their profession (Black, 1970). Beyond these values, career experience
may also have a role in determining how effective or successful a politician can
be. In the political sphere today there exists many so‐called “career politicians”.
A term used to label politicians that solely pursue political office and have not
made a career outside of government or political bubbles. A small body of work
has tried to explain whether these type of politicians differ in their behaviour, for
example, Dreher et al. (2009) explain the extent to which career politicians may
implement pro‐liberal policy changes. Other literature explains the existence
of career politicians (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) and how they make career
decisions (Keane and Merlo, 2010). The previous approach has been to combine
all types of political career into one universal definition, an approach that
often finds no robust result and obscures heterogeneity. A more disaggregated
approach to political careers may be required as different careers develop
different sets of skills.
In this paper I use Congressional experience in US governors to establish a
link between political career experience and intergovernmental transfers. The
transfer system in the US offers an exceptional opportunity to identify the effect
that career politicians can have. Specifically, I focus on a prior career in Congress
– having served in either the lower or upper legislative house in the US. I de-
velop a competency‐based theory. I form the testable hypothesis that governors
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with Congressional experience have more political nous, and, therefore, are more
effective at lobbying the president for federal funds.
The existing literature has comprehensively analysed how the federal budget is
allocated to states (see e.g., Berry et al., 2010; Albouy, 2013). However, beyond
the role of partisan alignment, the relevant characteristics of the governor in the
receiving state are unknown. These are of interest as it allows one to build a
picture of the factors that contribute to a politician’s human capital stock and
explain how politicians act.1 Currently, there is only sparse evidence regarding
the role of the sub‐national leader’s characteristics on the receipt of intergovern-
mental transfers (Veiga and Pinho, 2007).
I use a long panel dataset on federal‐to‐state transfers in the US over the
1950‐2008 period. I gather data on US governors Congressional service and per-
sonal background from their online profiles on the National Governors Associa-
tion (NGA) website. In order to identify the impact of Congressional experience
on transfers, I use a difference‐in‐differences style approach and test for a num-
ber of threats to identification. In sum, I find that governors who have previously
served as members of Congress, on average, increase the growth rate of transfers
to their state by 0.8 percentage points. I perform an event‐study to assess
the common trends assumption and find no indication of problematic pre‐ or
post‐treatment trends. I address selection concerns by showing that the election
of experienced governors appears idiosyncratic and therefore unproblematic.
The selection on unobservables would also have to be implausibly high to
completely explain away the effect. I conduct a placebo test using random treat-
ment assignment and find no evidence of a systematic error. Moreover, I repeat
the main analysis using an alternate dependent variable based on a state’s share
of total federal transfers and the relationship persists. To ensure random assign-
ment of the treatment, I explore the robustness of the result in close elections. I
then conduct a battery of sensitivity checks to ensure that the result is not driven
by outliers in the explanatory variable. For example, states that elect an experi-
enced governor more often or periods when governors with experience are more
prevalent. I also show that outliers in the distribution of transfers are not driving
the relationship. When exploring which governors may be driving this result, I
find that it is mostly the Republican governors and provide an explanation as
to why this may be.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature and
provides a theoretical groundwork; Section III briefly describes the institutional
setting; Section IV presents the data and empirical approach; Section V
presents the results; Section V shows some evidence on a potential channel;
1
There is also a body of work that shows that the intergovernmental transfer system is subject to manip-
ulation by politicians in countries beyond the US (see Veiga and Pinho (2007) for Portugal, Fouirnaies
and Mutlu‐Eren (2015) for the UK and Gonschorek et al. (2018) for Indonesia).
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and Section VI conducts robustness checks. Section VII concludes and discusses
the opportunities for future research.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This paper relates to the literature on political leaders (Jones and Olken, 2005;
Besley et al., 2011) and the allocation of transfers (Larcinese et al., 2006; Veiga
and Pinho, 2007). The latter shows how sub‐national transfer systems are
affected by political manipulation, specifically that transfers are directed toward
co‐partisans of the politician who sends the funds. Whilst the former papers both
use random leadership transitions owing to death or illness to show that the
national leader has an effect on the economic performance of their country.
Besley et al. (2011) proceed to explore how a certain characteristic, the educa-
tional attainment level, of the leader matters for economic growth. This paper
connects these two distinct literatures.
Leaders in general matter and so do their socio‐economic backgrounds. Hayo
and Neumeier (2016) show that the tenures of lower‐class leaders are associated
with a high deficit‐to‐GDP ratio relative to upper‐class leaders. The authors also
show that this is the case for German state prime ministers (Hayo and
Neumeier, 2014). Ruske (2015) shows that the type of education can matter, as
politicians holding a degree in economics tend to be more corrupt. Biology can
also affect decision making. Kozlov et al. (2018) find that Russian governors
with more testosterone exposure exhibit higher levels of repressiveness in their
region. With respect to gender, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) find no difference
between female and male US mayors in the size of government, composition
of expenditures or crime rates. They do, however, show that females have supe-
rior political skill compared to equivalent males. Likewise, Jochimsen and
Thomasius (2014) find no evidence that female finance ministers in German
states have different deficits relative to males. Also in Germany, Hayo and
Neumeier (2012) show that state governments led by a prime minister from a
poor background employ policies aimed at evening out inequalities.2
Regarding on‐the‐job experience, Moessinger (2014) show that a more expe-
rienced finance minister, measured by the number of years in the position, have
smaller increases in the debt‐to‐GDP ratio. Similarly, Fuchs and Richert (2017)
2
There is also a growing literature on leader origin, which shows that regions that provide national min-
isters or representatives are favoured. Hodler and Raschky (2014) show that the political leader favours
the sub‐national region they were born in. Whilst Dreher et al. (2016) demonstrate that African leaders’
birthplaces receive more funding from China than elsewhere. Similarly, Franck and Rainer (2012) find
that African leaders favour areas that have the same ethnic background as them. Jennes and Persyn (2015)
show that the transfers to electoral districts in Belgium are increasing with federal minister representation
from that district. On the supranational level, Gehring and Schneider (2018) show that the EU commis-
sioner for agriculture increases their country’s share of the overall EU budget.
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show that more experienced development ministers obtain larger aid budgets
because the longer time in office strengthens their ability to negotiate. On the
sub‐national level, Freier and Thomasius (2016) identify that German mayors
who have prior experience in office reduce public debt, lower expenditure and
decrease local tax rates.
More specific to this research, previous work has shown that the professional
background of political leaders affects the decisions they make when in office.
For instance, Dreher et al. (2009) shows that leaders who have a background
as an entrepreneur are more likely to implement pro‐market liberalizing reforms.
Whilst Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) show that former central bank staff prefer
lower inflation rates than former politicians. And Stadelmann et al. (2015) find
that politicians with a military background exhibit a higher chance of voting
pro‐military. In light of these findings, I hypothesize that a relevant experience
in politics, in this context Congress, should influence the work of governors.
There are at least two reasons why specifically Congressional experience may
be positively related to federal‐state transfers. First, governors who have spent
time in Congress will have been able to hone and build their political capital
working in the legislature on fiscal and legal agendas. Dahl and Lindblom (1953)
argue that bargaining, negotiation and comprise are the most critical skills for
success as a politician in the US. Technical experience in Congress should have
provided an insight into how the political machine works and will develop these
three skills on a daily basis. In order for a politician to be successful, they have to
bargain and negotiate with a variety of political actors that hold a variety of
interests. Thus, a less experienced politician may be unwilling to compromise
and resort to an ideological coalition. Developing these political skills will give
them an edge on the competing governors, holding all else constant. Second,
spending time in the legislature may have provided an insight into the usefulness
of extra funds for governors. Given that the federal budget has to be debated and
voted on in both the House of Representatives and Senate, not to mention numer-
ous committees and sub‐committees, all Congress members should be acutely
aware of state funding. Assuming that governors wish to increase their state’s
economic performance, the federal transfers system represents one channel that
the governors may wish to exploit.
While there is burgeoning body of work regarding how particular types of
background affect various economic outcomes, there exists very little work that
explores a specific type of prior job. This is likely a result of being unable to find
a sufficient link between an earlier career and one’s current role as a politician –
an area that this paper contributes to. Moreover, whilst some work has focused on
sub‐national leaders, none have so far explored how sub‐national leader’s prior
political experience affects the transfers to their locality. The most related study
to this is Veiga and Pinho (2007), who briefly address whether the number of
years in office as mayor in Portugal affects the transfers they receive from the
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central government and find a positive but insignificant effect. I also build on the
work by Dreher et al. (2009) who find no effect for the impact of a previous ca-
reer in politics in general on pro‐market reforms. Their political career variable
captures an array of political careers, whereas in actuality, it could be that specific
types of political jobs are more useful than others. Hence, more work is required
to identify the jobs that develop political capital.
III. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The federal budget in its current form is governed by the Budget and Impound-
ment Act of 1974. It came after President Nixon sought to reduce the budget
deficit by not spending funds that Congress had allocated in 1972. This act aimed
to strengthen Congress’ budget authority and reduce the president’s impound-
ment ability. Despite this, the budgetary process is one legal scholars argue that
the president maintains significant control over the budget due to the threat of
veto, which can only be overturned by a two‐thirds majority in each legislative
chamber (McCarty, 2000). Previous work has acknowledged the role of the
president in the distribution of federal resources. Levitt and Snyder (1997) point
out that “The inflow of federal funds to a district is affected by the decisions of a
large number of actors… The president plays major role, both in the budget pro-
cess and as chief executive”. Historical evidence of presidential influence over
the distribution of federal funds have been provided by scholarly work on the
New Deal. Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Couch and Shughart II (1998) find
a positive relationship between vote share and state‐level spending. Wallis (1987)
finds that states with more swing voters are targeted with more federal money.
Whereas, Fishback et al. (2003) find evidence that the president targets both loyal
voters and swing voters. At the state level, Larcinese et al. (2006) show that pres-
idents engage in tactical redistribution of federal funds by rewarding states that
supported them in previous elections and those that have a co‐partisan governor.
At the county and congressional district level, Berry et al. (2010) show that areas
represented by a president’s co‐partisan legislator receive more federal funds.
Whilst Kriner and Reeves (2012) show that counties that receive more federal
grants reward the incumbent president or his party. Other work has focused on
state representation in Congress. Albouy (2013) show that states represented
by members of Congress in the majority party receive greater federal grants as
they have greater proposal power or form coalitions with each other.
Although the literature on the US federal budget has highlighted the presi-
dent’s influence, no paper has yet investigated the role of the governors in a re-
cipient state. The governors are the head of the executive branch of the state
government. They have a high degree of autonomy on state administration, such
as the budget, policies and legislation, and departmental appointments. Regard-
ing the link between the governors and the federal budget, consider the following
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statement from Mitt Romney in 2004, then governor of Massachusetts. “For
Republican governors, it means we have an ear in the White House, we have a
number we can call, we have access that we wouldn’t gave otherwise had, and
that’s of course helpful”.3 Despite the partisan tone, this ex‐ ample illustrates
how governors can communicate with and influence the president to alter federal
expenditure. Moreover, at the 2017 Governor’s Ball, President Trump remarked,
in reference to a meeting with the state governors that “Everybody is different,
every state is different, and different requirements, but I think we have something
that’s going to be really excellent… But tomorrow morning, we’re going to meet
and have some pretty big sessions on healthcare and other things – whatever is
on your mind.” An admission that depicts the president and governors interacting
with one‐another and intent to explicitly discuss federal funding plans. The pres-
ident has also tweeted “Big dinner with Governors tonight at White House. Much
to be discussed, including healthcare.” This is further evidence of communication
between the president and governors regarding the federal spending agenda.
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This section provides a description of the variables of interest and motivates the
relevant control variables. I use a balanced panel of the 48 contiguous states
from the year 1950 up to the year 2008 ‐ the complete time span of the data
that is available. I also discuss the empirical strategy used to identify the effect
of interest.
I. Data
The dependent variable in the analysis is the growth rate of federal‐to‐state trans-
fers per capita in real terms.4 These are funds that are ultimately allocated by the
president in the federal budget and are used for specific functions, general finan-
cial assistance or as a share of tax proceeds.5 The transfers are comprised of
grants, aid, shared taxes, and contingent loans and advances. The federal
grants are the type of spending most susceptible to political control (Berry
et al., 2010). These data are obtained from the US Census of Governments. Given
that different states have different needs and economic situations, there is consid-
erable variation in the amount of transfers awarded to the states in a given year.
The median growth rate is 3.7 percentage points per year. Transfers are
3
Speaking after the re‐election of President G. W. Bush in 2004.
4
I use the growth rate rather than levels as I wish to capture short‐run changes in the transfers. Estimation
in levels is more suited to capturing longer‐term trends. Moreover, real per capita transfers in levels are
non‐stationary i.e. display a unit‐root.
5
Full for a complete breakdown of what is included and excluded in each category see https://www.cen-
sus.gov/govs/www/class_ch7_ir.html
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conventionally used to alleviate fiscal difficulty and to increase state welfare,
however, given the political involvement, it is important to explore how much
political manipulation can explain the differences across states.
The variable of interest in the analysis is a dummy variable denoted ‘Congres-
sional experience’. This takes the value 1 if a state governor has previously
served in either the House of Representative or the Senate prior to taking office
as state governor, and 0 otherwise. These data are hand collected from the
website of the NGA (see Figure A1 for an example of a governor’s profile).
There are 61 governors who are ex‐members of Congress which equates to
318 state‐year observations.6 Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the number of gov-
ernors with Congressional experience over time, with the mean number being 5.4
governors per year. The spatial distribution of the total number of observations of
governors with Congressional experience is presented in Figure 2. There are a
number of states that have not elected an experienced governor, for example
Wisconsin and Utah, and two states that have over 20 years with an experienced
governor, Connecticut and Louisiana.
6
The names of these governors are listed in Table A1.
Figure 1
The number of governors who have Congressional experience per year. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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I include a newly collected set of governor characteristics that are potentially
correlated with Congressional experience and transfers. I control for the age of
the governor and whether they are female to account for demographic differ-
ences. In addition, I control dichotomously for military service. In the US in par-
ticular, military service commands respect from politicians and therefore veterans
may be duly rewarded in the transfer system. Alternatively, they may receive
fewer transfers as they may be perceived to be better leaders. I include a measure
of the number of years
of on‐the‐job experience as more experienced governors are more likely to
receive more transfers. Gubernatorial election year dummies are included to
account for increased lobbying effort in a governor’s election year. I also include
a dummy to represent whether they are a “lame duck” and would therefore be
subject to fewer transfers. A lame duck is defined as whether or not the governor
is in the last year of their binding term limit. In terms of checks and balances, I
use a dummy for whether the two state legislative houses are controlled by
different parties, which may mean the governor receives less transfers because
they are politically restrained. I also account for whether the governor is politi-
cally aligned to the president as co‐partisan governors may be likely to receive
more federal funds.
Figure 2
The number of governors who have previously served as a member of Congress by state from 1950‐
2008. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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At the state‐level I control for incumbent president’s two‐party margin of
victory from the last presidential election. This accounts for presidents rewarding
states that provided them with more popular support. I include the previous
year’s per capita growth rate of: personal income, a state’s total own tax revenue
and population from the previous year as covariates to control for state economic
performance and size.7 The descriptive statistics are provided in Table A2.
II. Empirical strategy
The basic equation I estimate is as follows:
yst ¼ β1’Congressional experience’sgt þ β2X gt þ β3Zst þ μs þ τt þ ϵsgt (1)
where yst the growth rate of real per capita transfers to state s at time t;
‘Congressional experience’gst is the main explanatory variable that indicates
whether governor g in state s at time t has previously served as a member of
Congress; Xgt is a vector of governor characteristics; Zst is a vector of
state‐level control variables; μsand τt are state and year fixed effects, respec-
tively; and ϵsgt is the error term. The state and year fixed effects are included
to account for unobserved year‐specific and state‐specific shocks that could bias
the estimate of β1. The strategy is comparable to a difference‐in‐differences style
equation and therefore relies on the assumption of common trends in treated and
untreated states to establish a causal relationship. For the standard errors, I use
two‐way clustering at the state and year level (Cameron et al., 2011; Cameron
and Miller, 2015). This is because the dependent variable is effectively a share
of total transfers to all states, so correlation across states at each year will exist.8
V. RESULTS
I. Main results
Table 1 presents the main results. In column (1), I estimate the effect of Congres-
sional political experience on transfers without additional observable controls. In
columns (2) and (3), I include governor characteristics and then state controls as
well, respectively. In column (4) I include a lagged dependent variable in levels
as in growth equations. The coefficient of ‘Congressional experience’ is positive
and significant at the 1 percent level of significance in all columns. This is
interpreted as follows: when the governor has previously served as a member
of Congress, this leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the growth rate of
7
Changing whether these growth rates are at time t or t  1 does not affect the main result.
8
When clustering at only the state level, the results remain the same, see Table A3.
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transfers per capita to their state, ceteris paribus. For a fictive mean state, the
growth rate of transfers is 4.1 percentage points, so this effect is quite sizeable.
The coefficients on the other personal characteristics are small and generally
insignificant, this indicates that these do not help a governor secure more federal
funds. This is consistent with findings reported in the literature (Dreher
et al., 2009; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014; Moessinger, 2014). The exception here
is ‘Alignment’ and ‘Gubernatorial election’, which are positive and significant.9
The coefficient for ‘Alignment’ means that when governor and president are
co‐partisans the governor receives more federal money, in line with the findings
of Larcinese et al. (2006). The ‘Gubernatorial election’ coefficient indicates that
in years when the governor is up for election, they receive more funds as they
exert more effort lobbying for more resources to aid their or their party’s
re‐election chances.10
9
I have also experimented with interaction terms with these two variables and Congressional experience,
although no significant effect is found.
10
I have also controlled for governors behaviour in the year prior to elections, see Table A5. The
pre‐gubernatorial election variable appears statistically insignificant, implying that governors only exert
more effort to capture federal outlays in their election years.
Table 1
The effect of experience on transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Congressional
experience
0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.003)
Alignment 0.006* (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 0.005 (0.003)
Age 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) ‐0.000 (0.000)
Female 0.000 (0.010) ‐0.000 (0.010) ‐0.001 (0.009)
Years experience 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Military experience ‐0.003 (0.003) ‐0.004* (0.003) ‐0.003 (0.003)
Lame duck ‐0.001 (0.009) ‐0.001 (0.009) ‐0.005 (0.009)
Split govt. ‐0.000 (0.004) ‐0.002 (0.004) ‐0.002 (0.004)
Gubernatorial election 0.012** (0.006) 0.011** (0.006) 0.013** (0.006)
∆ ln incomet1 ‐0.154** (0.066) ‐0.152** (0.066)
∆ ln revenuet1 0.035 (0.030) 0.025 (0.028)
∆ ln populationt1 ‐0.064 (0.332) ‐0.245 (0.411)
Pres. victory margin 0.000 (0.000) ‐0.000 (0.000)
Level dep. var.t1 ‐0.108*** (0.020)
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R‐squared 0.353 0.356 0.355 0.395
Observations 2,784 2,784 2,736 2,736
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate
of real per capita federal‐state transfers. All columns include state and year fixed effects. The standard
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With a dichotomous variable of interest, I can easily evaluate the common
trend assumption that is necessary for a causal interpretation of the effect.
Despite using a comprehensive set of controls, state and year fixed effects, there
still may exist some bias. I can test this assumption by examining whether
pre‐treatment or post‐treatment trends exist for treated and untreated states that
would indicate non‐random selection. Given that political experience should
only affect transfers when the governor has served in Congress only, significant
lead‐variables would cast doubts on the interpretation of the results thus far.
Significant lag‐variables are not necessarily a violation of the assumption as
transfers may be contract based and take time to reverse.
To test this assumption I follow Gehring and Schneider (2018). I create two
lead variables, taking the value 1 only in the year (t  1) and two years (t  2)
before the treatment takes place, and 0 otherwise. I code four lag variables taking
the value 1 for the year after the treatment has been switched off in (t + 1) and up
to four years later (t + 4), and 0 otherwise. That is, the indicator at time t takes the
value 1 for all years when the governor is in office as in the main analysis. The
estimated specification remains the same as that in Table 1 column (3), which
includes all controls, state and year fixed effects.11 Table 2 depicts the results in-
cluding different leads and lags.
In column (1), both the lead variables are insignificant, whereas the coefficient
of interest re‐ mains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Column (2)
replaces leads for lags. Here all the lagged terms are insignificant and ‘Congres-
sional experience’ remains significant at the 1 percent level. Finally, column (3)
includes both leads and lags. The coefficient for ‘Congressional experience’
becomes 0.007, again significant at the 1 percent level. All leads and lags are
insignificant, giving no indication of any pre‐ or post‐treatment trends, whilst
‘Congressional experience’ remains significant throughout. This is critical for a
causal interpretation of the identified relationship. The coefficients for the leads
and lags for ‘Congressional experience’ are illustrated graphically in Figure 3.
VI. POTENTIAL CHANNELS
To uncover one of the potential channels, I focus on the grants system as a type of
federal expenditure. The previous literature has shown this type of federal
expenditure to be very susceptible to political manipulation (Berry et al., 2010;
Kriner and Reeves, 2012; Albouy, 2013). If this type of funding is known to
be susceptible to political influence, it is plausible that more experienced gover-
nors will target them. There are, however, quite possibly other channels that this
11





þ β1X gt þ β2Zst þ μs þ τt þ ϵsgt
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Congressional experience effect can operate through, for instance, federal aid.
The disaggregated grant data are from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report




Congressional experience (t‐2) ‐0.002 (0.011) ‐0.003 (0.011)
Congressional experience (t‐1) ‐0.005 (0.013) ‐0.005 (0.013)
Congressional experience 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.001)
Congressional experience (t+1) ‐0.007 (0.014) ‐0.018 (0.015)
Congressional experience (t+2) 0.005 (0.014) 0.011 (0.013)
Congressional experience (t+3) 0.006 (0.009) 0.002 (0.009)
Congressional experience (t+4) ‐0.007 (0.012) ‐0.008 (0.012)
All controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
R‐squared 0.355 0.402 0.356
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate
of real per capita federal‐state transfers. ‘All controls’ correspond to the specification in Table 1 col-
umn (3). The standard errors are multiway‐clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at the state





Leads and lags in ‘Congressional experience’. Notes: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals
are based on Table 2 column (3). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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grants and a breakdown of the total grouped by the department that handles them.
These are: the Department of Transportation covers, for example, highway plan-
ning and construction, airport improvement program, urban mass transportation
capital improvement grants. The Department of Education covers educationally
deprived children‐local educational agencies and handicapped‐state grants. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development covers lower income housing
assistance‐section VII. The Department of Health and Human Service covers,
Medicaid, children’s health insurance program social services block grants, fos-
ter care title IV‐E and head start. Grants for remaining departments are in the
“Other” category, for example, Agriculture.
Table 3 presents the estimates using the state level grants. In column (1), there
is a positive and statistically significant effect of Congressional experience on to-
tal federal grants. The estimate reveals that when the governor is one with Con-
gressional experience, they increase the growth rate of federal grants a state
receives by 1.4 percentage points. This is reassuring for the main results as this
shows evidence that one specific type of federal expenditure is subject to political
manipulation, and is in line with the previous literature (Albouy, 2013). When
the grants are disaggregated by department, there appears to be some taste effects
as the experienced governors seemingly prefer to capture more Health and Hu-
man Services grants.
VII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
This section sets out to address how robust the relationship is. First, I address
some possible selection concerns. Secondly, I perform a placebo exercise and
use an alternate dependent variable. I then explore how sensitive the result is
to excluding certain years and states. Finally, I split ‘Congressional experience’
into two variables based on the two‐party system.
I. Selection concerns
One possible concern is the selection of leaders. If certain circumstances, such as
an economic or political crisis, affect both the probability of electing a governor
with Congressional experience and transfers, then there is an endogeneity issue.
To allay this concern, I repeat the diagnostics in Dreher et al. (2009). Results are
presented in Table 4 Panel A. To be precise, I examine the probability of electing
a governor with Congressional experience. It appears that the selection of expe-
rienced governors is idiosyncratic, the exception being the growth rate of per-
sonal income which is controlled for in the analysis.
As there appears to be little problem with selection on observables, I now con-
sider the extent to which there may be a bias from selection on unobservables. To
do so, I follow the methods in Altonji et al. (2005). Under the assumption that
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Table 3
The effect of experience on grants
Total Education Housing & Urban Development Health & Human Services Defense Transportation Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Congressional experience 0.014** (0.006) ‐0.008 (0.011) ‐0.009 (0.016) 0.024** (0.010) ‐0.121 (0.126) ‐0.008 (0.014) 0.009 (0.023)
All controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R‐squared 0.510 0.620 0.868 0.459 0.499 0.433 0.711
Observations 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,004 1,008 1,008
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita grants of the category listed in the column header. ‘All con-
trols’ correspond to the specification in Table 1 column (4). The standard errors are multiway‐clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at the state and year level and























































selection on observables is equal to the selection on unobservables, this method
produces the ratio of selection on unobservables to observables that would be re-
quired to explain away the ‘Congressional experience’ effect.
To implement this, I estimate regressions using two sets of covariates. In the
first regression, I include only the treatment indicator and state and year fixed ef-
fects. In the second, I use the full set of covariates along with the fixed effects.
The estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator
from the two regressions are bβlimited and bβfull. Using these coefficients, I com-




The results are presented in Table 4 Panel B. The ratio implies that selection on
unobservables needs to be 56 times as strong as the selection on observables to
fully explain away the relationship between experience and transfers, this is
implausibly high.
II. Placebo test and alternate dependent variables
To support that the statistical inference of the Congressional experience effect is
not a result of a systematic error, I implement a randomization test. This is
Table 4
Selection of leaders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A









∆ ln revenuet1 0.399 (0.461) 0.445 (0.480) 0.403 (0.457) 0.438 (0.461)
∆ ln populationt1 0.227 (6.826) 0.882 (7.064) 0.474 (6.938) 0.646 (6.969)
Pres. victory margin 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
Alignment 0.100 (0.194) 0.038 (0.199)
Dem. Gov. ‐0.198 (0.303) ‐0.194 (0.309)
‐0.094 (0.350) ‐0.050 (0.331)
Governor‐house
aligned


















Notes: Panel A shows pooled logit estimates are conducted with standard errors clustered at the state
level. The dependent variable is Congressional experience. Panel B shows selection ratios from
Altonji et al. (2005). βlimited is obtained from an OLS regression) with state and year fixed effects only,
βfull is obtained from an OLS regression with state and year fixed effects, as well as all observable
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particularly useful when the number of treated observations could be considered
small. There are 319 treated observations, which constitutes about 11 percent of
the total sample. The goal is to randomly assign treatment to control units, whilst
removing the treated ones. No significant effect increases the confidence that
‘Congressional experience’ is correctly identified in actual treated units.
The results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) assigns treatment status to
about 11 percent of the sample, column (2) 15 percent and column (3) 20 percent.
As expected the coefficients are not significantly different from 0. This furthers
the confidence that the experience effect has been correctly identified.
To demonstrate the robustness of this result I construct an alternate dependent
variable. I use the percentage point change in a state’s federal transfers as share
of total federal transfer outlays. I repeat the analysis in Table 1 using the change
in the state’s share as the dependent variable. The results are presented in
Table A4. As before, the coefficient for ‘Congressional experience’ is positive
and significant at the 1 percent level in all columns.
III. Close elections
In an ideal scenario, I would exploit the closeness of the gubernatorial election
results in a regression discontinuity framework. This would follow the approach
set out by Brollo and Troiano (2016) who investigate what happens when a fe-
male wins a close election. This approach requires the researchers to observe that
the losing candidate is a male. In this case, I would need to observe whether the
losing candidate has, or does not have, Congressional experience, which is
Table 5
Random assignment of treatment status
11% 15% 20%
(1) (2) (3)
Congressional experience [random] 0.005 (0.006) ‐0.004 (0.005) 0.004 (0.003)
All controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
R‐squared 0.350 0.350 0.350
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate
of real per capita federal‐state transfers. ‘All controls’ correspond to the specification in Table 1 col-
umn (3). Treatment assignment is assigned using the randtreat command in Stata. In columns (1),
(2) and (3) treatment is assigned to 11%, 15% and 20% of the sample, respectively. The standard errors
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unfortunately not available. However, to defensibly ensure some randomness in
the assignment of Congressional experience, I repeat the analysis in a sub‐sample
of observations where governors were elected in a close election. This approach
explores the effect of Congressional experience in a governor when it is ran-
domly assigned at the margin of a close election victory to those governors with-
out experience who also won a close election.
Table 6 presents the results. Columns (1) shows the results in a sample where
governors where elected by less than a 1.5% margin of victory. Again, I find a
positive and statistically significant relationship. When one considers slightly
wider election results in the proceeding columns, 2% and 2.5%, the coefficient
remains positive and significant. This is reassuring for the main result as I find
the same result for experienced politicians who were randomly assigned gover-
norships via a close election.
IV. Partisan split
As I am using data from the US, I can exploit the two‐party system that domi-
nates US politics. This will allow one to see if one party is driving the results.
I split the ‘Congressional experience’ variable into two new variables, to identify
whether the governor is a Democrat or Republican and has served as member of
Congress. These are denoted ‘Dem. Congressional experience’ and ‘Rep. Con-
gressional experience’. Experience is about evenly distributed between the two
parties. There are 159 state‐year observations of Democratic governors who have
served in Congress, and 155 observations of Republican governors.12 I repeat the
analysis in Table 1 but instead include the two new explanatory variables.
12





Congressional experience 0.102** (0.049) 0.105** (0.050) 0.096* (0.050)
All controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓
R‐squared 0.564 0.509 0.429
Observations 118 136 164
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate
of real per capita federal‐state transfers. ‘All controls’ correspond to the specification in Table 1 col-
umn (3). The standard errors are multiway‐clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation at the state
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The results are presented in Table 7. Generally, it appears that the results are
driven by the Republican governors. The coefficient shows that experienced
Republican governors increase the transfers to their state by about 0.9 percentage
points, holding all else constant. The coefficient for experienced Democratic
governors is positive but only weakly significant. A test of coefficient equality
confirms that they are significantly different from each other. This is surprising
and contrary to what one may expect, given that state governments with
more right‐wing legislators prefer smaller state governments (Pickering and
Rockey, 2013). One plausible explanation for this effect is as follows. As Repub-
lican governors are ideologically constrained in increasing their state’s expendi-
ture, they will therefore seek out more federal transfers as a less visible
alternative using their superior political skill. Arguably, the Democratic governors
do not need to lobby to the same extent and exert extra effort to capture more fed-
eral funds as they are less constrained in increasing their state’s expenditures.
V. Sensitivity checks
In order to show that the relationship between experience and transfers is not sen-
sitive to outliers in the data, I perform a number of additional checks.13 A concern
may be that the result is driven by states who are more likely to elect an
13
In the Table A5 I include a number of other potentially relevant covariates. The result remains qualita-
tively the same. I also repeat the common trends check with a lagged dependent variable, see Figure A2,
the result remains unaffected.
Table 7
Democrats versus Republicans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dem. Congressional
experience
0.007 (0.004) 0.008* (0.004) 0.008* (0.004) 0.005 (0.005)
Rep. Congressional
experience
0.011*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.005)
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Governor controls ✓ ✓ ✓
State controls ✓ ✓
Lagged level dep. var. ✓
R‐squared 0.353 0.355 0.355 0.402
p‐value: βDem.= βRep. 0.535 0.867 0.867 0.118
Observations 2,784 2,736 2,736 2,736
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate
of real per capita federal‐state transfers. The standard errors are multiway‐clustered to allow for arbi-
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Table 8
Sensitivity checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Congressional
experience
0.010*** (0.004) 0.007** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.016* (0.009) 0.007*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002)
All controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Exclusion – States Years Years Regions Regions Winsor [1,99] Winsor [5,95]
Treated Obs. 311 217 254 305 82 228 310 310
R‐squared 0.428 0.364 0.343 0.392 0.359 0.394 0.363 0.358
Observations 2,736 2,451 2,448 2,400 1,311 1,425 2,736 2,736
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates where the dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real per capita federal‐state transfers. ‘All controls’ corre-
spond to the specification in Table 1 column (3). Column (1) includes a lagged dependent variable in first difference as well as one in levels. Columns (2) removes
states that have governors with Congressional experience for more than 15 years. Column (3) removes years when there are more than 9 governors in the US with
Congressional experience, the 90th percentile. Column (4) removes years when there are less than 1 governor in the US with Congressional experience, the 10th
percentile. Column (5) use only states in the West and Midwest region, while column (6) uses only states in the South and North East region. The standard errors




































































experienced governor or periods of time when there are more governors with ex-
perience in the US. Also, I explore how the results are affected by outliers in the
dependent variable. I repeat the preferred specification (Table 1 column (3)) and
make exclusions based on either states or years.
The results are shown in Table 8. In column (1) include a lagged dependent
variable as well as a lagged dependent variable in levels. In column (2) I exclude
states that provide governors with experience more than 15 times in the 59 years
they are observed. This is keeping the bottom 90th percentile. The coefficient
falls to 0.006 but remains statistically significant. In column (3) and
(4) I exclude high and low periods of governors with experience. Specifically,
I drop years when there are more than 9 governors with political experience in
column (3), this is the dropping the top 10th percentile. In column (4) I drop
the bottom 10th percentile, that is, dropping years when there are no governors
with experience. The coefficient remains stable at 0.008 and significant at the 1
percent level. The proceeding two columns exclude states based on which region
they are in, here I split the US into two parts. Column (5) includes states in the
West and Midwest regions, whilst column (6) includes only states in the South
and North East. A stronger significant effect is found in the latter, although this
possibly because there are much fewer treated observations in the states located
in West and Midwest. Column (7) and (8) winsorize the dependent variable. This
is a process that replaces extreme values in the tails of the distribution with
values further down the ranks. Column (7) replaces values below (above) the
1st (99th) percentile with the 1st (99th) percentile value. Column (8) repeats this
exercise with the 5th and 95th percentile. The coefficient of experience falls to
0.007 but remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined whether and to what extent do career politicians differ in
their behaviour from non‐experienced ones. Specifically using evidence from
Congressional experience in US governors and assessing the extent to which this
affects the amount of intergovernmental revenue their state receives from the
federal government. The role of political experience has been examined in the
previous literature with no clear consensus reached, whilst the political influences
on sub‐national transfers received little attention. Considering this gap in the liter-
ature, this is an important topic of research. This paper has gone beyond the previ-
ous literature which has focused only on a general career in politics or the number
of years of on‐the‐job experience. Specifically, this paper is the first to explore a
specific type of political experience and what effect this can have on future polit-
ical economy outcomes. The specific experience refers to having served in the
House of Representatives or the Senate. I hypothesized that governors who have
Congressional experience should have more political capital and therefore be
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better at lobbying the president for federal transfers to their state. To test that
hypothesis, I use data on federal outlays to states over the period 1950‐2008.
Findings show that a governor who has previously been a member of Congress
increases the intergovernmental revenue to their state by 0.8 percentage points. I
also show evidence for one channel that this can occur through, the federal grant
system, which the previous literature has shown to be subject to political manipu-
lation. The finding remains robust to a number of different regression specifica-
tions. Moreover, there appears no reason not to label this effect as a causal one. I
find no significant effect for being a female governor or having more years of ex-
perience on‐the‐job. There is a weak negative relationship between a governor
who served in the military and the transfers they receive. In a gubernatorial elec-
tion year, governors exert more effort and thus receive more funds. I find that it
is the experienced Republican governors who are driving this relationship as they
seek federal money as an alternate to increasing the size of their state government.
The findings contribute to the expanding literature that shows that political
leaders can have a significant influence of economic outcomes. The findings here
should not necessarily be used to dismiss the benefits of having a more experi-
enced governor. A career background in politics is very likely beneficial to one’s
current human capital, political skill and, in turn, state outcomes. Instead, the im-
pact of this research should be to raise awareness about the shortcomings of a po-
litical structure that allows, and encourages, lobbying from external recipients.
This paper presents a number of openings for future research in this literature.
One avenue may be to delve deeper into the governor’s backgrounds to explore
other political jobs that increase their political capital. It would also be interesting
to investigate whether ex‐members of Congress have different spending or taxa-
tion priorities. Perhaps they are more likely to increase state expenditure if they
know they can negotiate for more federal funds.
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Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this
article at the publisher’s website:
Figure A1: Example profile of a governor on the NGA webpage.
Table A1: List of governors with Congressional experience
Table A2: Summary statistics
Table A3: The effect of experience on transfers: alternate clustering
Table A4: The effect of experience on transfers: alternate dependent variable
Table A5: Robustness: extra control variables
Figure A2: Leads and lags in ‘Congressional experience’.
SUMMARY
This paper exploits the presence of Congressional experience in US governors that permits the identification
of the relationship between political career experience and intergovernmental transfers. I assemble a novel
dataset of governors’ political background and match this to federal transfer data from 1950 to 2008. Gov-
ernors with Congressional experience have 0.8 percentage points more transfers to their state. I show evi-
dence for one potential channel that this may act through, the federal grants system. The findings are
robust to outliers in the data, selection effects, close elections and an alternative dependent variable based
on a state’s share of total federal transfers
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